5 June 1974

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Thanks for showing me your draft note. It makes points that need to be made and I would strongly encourage you to give it to the Director since it brings up a number of issues on which he should focus.

I do have a couple of comments, but they should be read in (and only in) the context of my basic endorsement and im support of your essential argument. OCI is too hierarchical. There are too many supervisory levels between analysts and publications. Substantive meaning is frequently changed in detrimental ways without the substantively knowledgeable authors being consulted or having any voice in the matter until the deed has been done. The grade structure does need revision. People should not be forced to become bureaucrats in order to advance professionally -- particularly, the price of professional advancement should not be foresaking what one does well (e.g., substantive analysis) to pursue what one may do indifferently (e.g., management of others' work), especially when ineffective discharge of the latter function can hamper effective discharge of the former by one's former colleagues. Analysts do need a greater sense of involvement and a greater voice in the end product. There also needs to be a better and more genuine dialogue between the Indians on whose labors all of us stand or fall and the senior levels of management.

Accepting and endorsing all of the above, however, the picture is not totally one-sided, and the whole picture needs to be seen in proper perspective if truly effective corrective action is to be taken. Perhaps inadvertantly you put your finger on another area of continuing difficulty: the fact that what "conscientious analysts ... all know" is not always accurate, despite the certitude of their convictions.

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For example, one quarter of the NIO secretaries -- do carpool and got their lane
permits as a result. To echo your own prose, this
is a petty point but indicative of something that
needs to be considered.

Analysts, particularly in OCI, have a number of legitimate grievances which need address -- as you point out most cogently. Nonetheless, it is also the case that many analysts -- including quite a few in OCI -- are extremely thin-skinned and prone to take umbrage where the equities are not quite as one-sided as they are wont to believe. Many writers are indeed touchy about their prose and reluctant to accept either well warranted editorial suggestions or necessary decisions, such as those required by having to fit a 400-word piece into a 300-word space and, hence, needing to prune 100 words late at night 15 minutes before a printing deadline. Furthermore, many analysts are more than a little prone to selfrighteousness and quick to impute sinister motives to legitimate differences of judgmental opinion. Also, members of the analytic fraternity do sometimes forget that we do run a compartmented organization in which everybody does not, and should not, necessarily know everything. In my own former incarnation I used to derive more than a little wry amusement from passionate assertions that the Agency had never been consulted on various issues, when in fact the key analysts directly involved had actually been working around the clock on the matters in question.

Finally, there is a strain of thinking prevalent in a number of analysts -- again including many in OCI -- which I regard as quite unhealthy. Ironically, but perhaps not entirely coincidentally, this was a prominent theme in that vicious PLAYBOY denegration of Bill Colby -- the theme that the Agency is divided into sheep and goats: the pure analysts, totally virtuous in their objective rectitude and the fallen operators, an amoral lot with few redeeming virtues. (Managers, in this context, tend to be lumped with operators.) In this catechism, analysts (alone) have convictions, others (especially operators) have biases. Analysts have subtle, sensitive perceptions;

operators (by definition) do not. Analysts are able; operators (generally) are not. When they are, that is also bad because operators tend to find soapboxes uncongenial and are generally prone to acknowledge that their superiors do actually have the right to make decisions and issue instructions with which subordinates may not always agree.

In sum, you have a case, it is a good one, and it ought to be put to the DCI with vigorous, forceful argumentation. The total picture has some complicating elements, however, and the honors are not all on one side of the fence.

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O/D/DCI/NIO: GACarver

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Analyst-editor frictions in connection with the NID should not be laughed off as stemming only from analysts' petty vanity over having their "beautiful Prose" tampered with. The particular problem, which Lehman appreciates and is working on, is of meaning being changed at night when the analyst isn't around to be consulted.

The root problem is a declining sense of analyst personal involvement and responsibility -- which has a lot to do with the general decline in morale in OCI. always has been some of this. When I was new in OCI the very bright (and since departed) fellow at the next desk said he got up each morning thinking "probably nothing important will happen in my area and if it does, someone else will handle it." Analysts there are used to being overruled, if only because the place is so damned hierarchical (at least four levels of supervisors between analyst and publication, with changes coming down the chain of command as often as But being overruled without even a chance face-to-face). to argue back is a new element. At the same time, analysts have lost the Divisional "Staff Notes" as a means for Those used to go out to expressing their own ideas. other specialists clearly labeled uncoordinated and preliminary analyst opinion. Now that they are put in hard

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cover, as a substitute for the NID to consumers not receiving the latter, the Notes, too, have to be approved up and down the hierarchy. Unfortunately, many analysts see the NIOs as yet another layer of bureaucracy between themselves and their readers (I know that isn't what you or the NIOs intend, or how I think that system's developing; but that has yet to be fully demonstrated to OCI's analysts).

This is not a problem that ever can be solved. Large organizations have to be somewhat hierarchical. (Which is one reason I feel strongly that OPR, or whatever group you choose to be the "cutting edge of analysis," must be kept small.) But there are some changes which could alleviate the problem.

- 1. Brownman's new parking-permit system to encourage car pooling. Only clock-watchers can car pool. Conscientious analysts who put in a 13-hour day to see an important NID piece clear through the editorial process and then hike to the West Parking Lot all know that every single NIO secretary has lane parking (no nonsense about car pooling there!). I know this is a petty point; but it's indicative to analysts of how they rate in your scheme of values.
- 2. Promotions. Grades are higher, time-in-grade considerably shorter, for people in the superstructure (NIO

and IC Staffs, odd jobs like mine) than for people doing the real work of the Agency--collecting and analyzing information. This, of course, is a more important indicator to analysts of how important their trade is in the Agency's scheme of things. The Estimates Board used to be a way (admittedly much abused) of going to "the top" (GS-18) and still being purely substantive. Now the time comes quite early in successful careers when the only way to go on advancing is to become a bureaucrat. Is this consistent with your repeated statement that the ultimate objective around here is substantive production?

- 3. OCI's own chain of command. Shorten it. Some of those layers have become places to put problem people. We badly need a selection out process. Getting rid of the lowest five percent is a start. But what about those very able people who would never fall into the lowest five, but who at some point in their careers begin to coast (and who might not if they felt a continuing need to prove themselves)? And those who, because they've done one job competently for a long time, get promoted above their competence and become a problem?
- 4. The OPR succession. Put a first-class, proven political analyst in that job--not a "manager," or someone senior who's background is irrelevant but who happens to be up for reassignment. This appointment will be an important

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signal, especially to OPR but in OCI as well, of how importantly you take analysis, and analysts.

Three things you've already started are a big help.

1. Extended area trips, preferably with a research project in mind. Aside from being more fun than the former two-three week tourist-type look at an area (and there's nothing wrong with fun), a real immersion in and study of a problem is so clearly a sign of more serious Agency interest in developing deeper analyst understanding of his subject. Better still would be an expansion of the presently very rare practice of putting analysts in

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for tours--useful both for area education and contact with policy types.

- 2. Some of the NIOs are working quite hard at putting analysts in their area in touch with policy types at the appropriate level (e.g., State country desks)—what STAT calls the "Indians to Indians" approach.
- 3. Your own meetings with analysts and general demonstration of interest in substantive matters. (And whatever happened to those weekly meetings with one NIO and his workers?) This is far and away the biggest improvement during my 11 years in the Agency. A sense that you read, listen to analysts arguments, peddle the stuff around town and solicit ideas for what questions we can usefully

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address, make our product more relevant in fact and is a great morale booster out here. One cautionary note: analysts are professionally trained to look behind what "leaders" say to what they mean and do. So just pep talks from you (about your appreciation of them and/or devotion to analytical integrity), if not supported by pretty concrete demonstrations that analysts are as important in your scheme of things as managers and customers men, will only add to the cynicism around here.